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Abstract
We present a decentralized message exchange process (taˆtonnement process) for deter-
mining the level at which a certain public good will be provided to a set of individuals who
finance the cost of attaining that level. The message exchange process we propose requires
minimal coordination overhead and converges to the optimal solution of the corresponding
centralized problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The inspiration for this work comes from the following question:
Suppose a community of individuals/agents have to determine the level at which
a certain public good will be provided to all of them. For example they have to decide
on the quality of a public transportation system or the resources devoted to running
a public school. The cost of attaining any particular level of the public good has
to be financed by the individual/agent contributions. Under the assumption that the
satisfaction (utility) of each individual—which is a function of his contribution and
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2the amount of produced public good—is its private information, what is the optimal
value of the public good that maximizes the social welfare?
This problem is called the public good problem [1], [2], and addresses the question
of allocating individual resources toward a public good in order to maximize the sum
of the individuals’ utilities. Taˆtonnement processes for solving the public good problem
have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature, [3]–[7]. They have also
appeared in the context of resource allocation problems in communication networks [8].
Decomposition methods for convex optimization problems resembling the public good
problem have appeared in the engineering literature [9], [10].
In this paper, we provide a decentralized method for solving the public good prob-
lem. The method is different from those appearing in [3]–[8], satisfies the problem’s
informational and resource constraints, requires minimal coordination overhead and
converges to the optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem. According
to the method, the public good problem is decomposed by first posing it as a convex
optimization problem and then deriving the respective dual decomposition. We show
that the dual problem can be separated into a single planner problem and multiple
agent subproblems. The decomposition is amenable to algorithms that have minimal
messaging exchange overhead and satisfy all the informational and resource constraints
of the original problem. Moreover, the dual-decomposed problem can be solved using
simple subgradient methods, and the optimality of the solutions can be guaranteed.
To the best of our knowledge, the approach to the solution of the public good problem
formulated/investigated in this paper provides a new decomposition methodology
that is simple to implement and is physically meaningful. Furthermore, the proposed
solution methodology does not require quasi-linearity or monotonicity properties of the
agents’ utility functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the public
good problem we propose to investigate. In Section III we present a taˆtonnement process
that satisfies the informational and resource constraints of the problem and leads to the
optimal solution of the centralized optimization problem corresponding to the problem
of Section II. We conclude in Section IV. The proofs of technical results appear in the
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3Appendix.
Notation: We use the following notation throughout the paper. We denote by ‖ · ‖
the ℓ2-norm. We denote vectors by bold-face symbols, as in x. We denote by x
T the
transpose of x.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our problem formulation is as in [2]. Consider a community A ofm individuals/agents,
A := {1, 2, . . . , m}, who have to determine the level x at which a certain public good will
be provided to all of them. The cost of attaining any particular level of the public good
has to be financed by individual/agent contributions ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, of a private good;
we may think of it as money, where ti stands for the private contribution of individual
i. For simplicity, we assume that the production of the public good displays constant
returns, so that a total contribution of T ≡
∑m
i=1 ti may finance a public good at level
x = T . Notice that, given constant returns, a transformation rate between private and
public good equal to one can be simply obtained by a suitable choice of units, i.e., the
units in which money is expressed.
Let wi > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, be the amount of private good originally held by each
individual/agent i. The amount of wi is agent i’s private information. His preference
over public good levels and his own contribution are assumed to be represented by a
function of the form
Ui : R+ × (−∞, wi]→ R, (1)
that specifies the utility Ui(x, ti) enjoyed by agent i when the level of public good is x
and his individual contribution is ti. In principle, the individual contribution could
be negative, which would be interpreted as the receipt of (positive) transfers. The
function Ui is agent i’s private information. We assume that all utility functions Ui(·, ·)
are increasing in their first argument, decreasing in their second argument, and jointly
strictly concave in x and ti. We do not assume that Ui, i ∈ A, is quasilinear or monotonic.
Now consider a planner who does not know the agents’ utility functions and the
amounts wi, i ∈ A, of the agents’ private goods. The planner’s goal is to design a
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4mechanism to select the level x of the public good and the individual contributions ti,
i ∈ A, so as to solve the weighted total utility maximization problem
maximize
m∑
i=1
αiUi(x, ti)
subject to
m∑
j=1
tj ≥ x
0 ≤ x ≤ L
ti ≤ wi, ∀i ∈ A
, (2)
where for any i ∈ A, αi > 0 and αi is known to the planner. We assume that the feasible
set is nonempty; i.e., that there exists some xˆ and tˆi, i = 1, . . . , m, within the domain of
the objective such that
∑m
j=1 tj ≥ x, 0 ≤ x ≤ L, and ti ≤ wi for all i = 1, . . . , m.
If the planner knew Ui and wi for any i, he could obtain x and ti for all i ∈ A by
solving the mathematical programming problem defined by (2). Since Ui and wi are
agent i’s private information the planner has to specify a mechanism, that is, a message
space, a message exchange process and an allocation rule which determines x and ti for
any i ∈ A, based on the outcome of the message exchange process. The mechanism must
be such that x and ti, i ∈ A, is a solution of the mathematical programming problem
defined by (2).
III. THE PLANNER’S MECHANISM
We specify a mechanism that satisfies the problem’s informational and resource con-
straints and results in an allocation x and ti for all i ∈ A that is a solution of problem
(2). The mechanism is defined by the following taˆtonnement process described by
Algorithm 1 below. In this algorithm the parameters ζk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., are chosen in
a way similar to that in [11] so that
∞∑
k=0
ζk =∞,
∞∑
k=0
ζ2k <∞
(an example of such a sequence ζk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., is ζk =
r
k+1
where r = constant, r > 0).
The key features of Algorithm 1 are described by the following theorem.
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5Algorithm 1 The Planner’s Mechanism
1: Set k := 0. The planner initializes λ(0) := (λ1(0), λ2(0), . . . , λm(0)) = 0, and µ(0) :=
(µ1(0), µ2(0), . . . , µm(0)) is arbitrary and bounded. The planner also initializes gmin :=
∞.
2: The planner announces λ(k) = (λ1(k), λ2(k), . . . , λm(k)), µij(k) (for all j < i) and
µji(k) (for all j > i) to each agent i, i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
3: Agent i, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, solves
maximize αiUi(xi, ti) + ti
m∑
j=1
λj(k)− xiλi(k) + xi
[
i−1∑
j=1
µij(k)−
m∑
j=i+1
µji(k)
]
subject to 0 ≤ xi ≤ L
ti ≤ wi
for variables xi ∈ R and ti ∈ R. Let x¯i(k) and t¯i(k) be a solution to agent i’s problem,
and let gi(λ(k),µ(k)) denote the optimal value of agent i’s problem at this solution.
Agent i announces x¯i(k), t¯i(k), and gi(λ(k),µ(k)) to the planner.
4: The planner computes
g(λ(k),µ(k)) =
m∑
i=1
gi(λ(k),µ(k)).
If g(λ(k),µ(k)) ≤ gmin, the planner updates gmin := g(λ(k),µ(k)) and kmin := k. Set
λmin(k) := λ(kmin)
µmin(k) := µ(kmin).
5: The planner updates λi(k), i = 1, 2, . . . , m, according to
λi(k + 1) =
[
λi(k)− ζk
[
m∑
j=1
t¯j(k)− x¯i(k)
]]+
.
The planner also updates µij(k), i, j = 1, 2, . . . , m where i > j, according to
µij(k + 1) = µij(k)− ζk[x¯i(k)− x¯j(k)].
6: Update k := k + 1 and go to Step 2.
7: At the stationary point, i.e., when convergence is achieved, the planner sets k⋆ :=
kmin. Then x
⋆
i := x¯i(kmin) and t
⋆
i := t¯i(kmin) for all i ∈ A, where x¯i(kmin) and t¯i(kmin)
are associated with (λmin(∞),µmin(∞)). The planner also sets λ
⋆ := λmin(∞) and
µ⋆ := µmin(∞). The planner charges agent i the amount
γi(λ
⋆,µ⋆) = x⋆iλ
⋆
i − x
⋆
i
[
i−1∑
j=1
µ⋆ij −
m∑
j=i+1
µ⋆ji
]
− t⋆i
m∑
j=1
λ⋆j .
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6Theorem 1. Under the assumption that there exists at least one solution to the dual of problem
(2) that lies in a compact subset C of Rm+ × R
m(m−1)
2 with diameter Λ,1 Algorithm 1 has the
following properties:
• The limits satisfy
lim
k→∞
λmin(k) = λ
⋆ (3)
lim
k→∞
µmin(k) = µ
⋆ (4)
• The level of public good x⋆ and the taxes t⋆ := (t⋆1, t
⋆
2, . . . , t
⋆
m) that correspond to λ
⋆ and
µ⋆ and result from Step 3 of the algorithm are solutions of problem (2).
Proof: See the appendix.
Remark 1. The assumption under which the assertions of the theorem hold is not restrictive.
In fact if, based on the problem, the compact set C and its diameter Λ are chosen appropriately
by the planner, a solution of the dual problem of (2) will lie in C.
IV. CONCLUSION
We presented a taˆtonnement process to determine the level at which a certain public
good must be provided to a set of individuals. The taˆtonnement process satisfies the
informational and resource constraints of the public good problem, requires minimal
coordination overhead and converges to the optimal solution of the corresponding
centralized problem. Furthermore, the proposed solution methodology dose not require
quasi-linearity or monotonicity properties of the agents’ utility functions.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Note that for ease of exposition, we have set the subgradient update coefficient ζk to
be the same for both the λ updates and the µ updates in Step 5 of Algorithm 1. This
is not strictly necessary, as our proofs can be easily adapted—with some additional
bookkeeping—to the case when the two updates have different coefficients.
We first redefine the utility functions in order to make some of the problem’s con-
straints implicit. For all i ∈ A, let
U˜i(z, u) =

 Ui(z, u), if 0 ≤ z ≤ L and u ≤ wi−∞, otherwise . (5)
Then problem (2) is equivalent to
maximize
m∑
i=1
αiU˜i(x, ti)
subject to
m∑
j=1
tj ≥ x
. (6)
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8We expand problem (2) as follows:
maximize
m∑
i=1
αiU˜i(xi, ti)
subject to
m∑
j=1
tj ≥ xi, ∀i ∈ A
xi = xj , ∀(i, j) such that i 6= j
, (7)
where the optimization variables are now xi ∈ R and ti ∈ R, for all i ∈ A. Define
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm), t = (t1, t2, . . . , tm), λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λm) and µ = (µij | i, j =
1, 2, . . . , m, and i > j).
The Lagrangian of (7) is
L(x, t,λ,µ) =
m∑
i=1
αiU˜i(xi, ti) +
m∑
i=1
λi
[
m∑
j=1
tj − xi
]
+
∑
(i,j):i>j
µij [xi − xj ] (8)
=
m∑
i=1
(
αiU˜i(xi, ti) + ti
m∑
j=1
λj − xiλi + xi
[
i−1∑
j=1
µij −
m∑
j=i+1
µji
])
, (9)
where λi, i = 1, . . . , m, are the respective Lagrange multipliers associated with the
financing constraints
∑m
j=1 tj ≥ xi, and µij , i, j = 1, . . . , m and i > j, represent the
multipliers associated with the pairwise equalities xi = xj . Notice that considering all
pairs (i, j) where i 6= j, is the same as considering all i and j such that i > j.
Let g(λ,µ) = sup
x,t L(x, t,λ,µ). Then the dual to problem (7) is
minimize g(λ,µ)
subject to λi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , m
, (10)
where the variables are λ ∈ Rm+ and µ ∈ R
m(m−1)
2 . By assumption, there is at least one
solution of (10) that lies in C.
We decompose g(λ,µ) so that g(λ,µ) =
∑m
i=1 gi(λ,µ), where gi(λ,µ), i ∈ A, is the
optimal value of the problem
maximize αiU˜i(xi, ti) + ti
m∑
j=1
λj − xiλi + xi
[
i−1∑
j=1
µij −
m∑
j=i+1
µji
]
(11)
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9which is equivalent to the problem
maximize αiUi(xi, ti) + ti
m∑
j=1
λj − xiλi + xi
[
i−1∑
j=1
µij −
m∑
j=i+1
µji
]
subject to 0 ≤ xi ≤ L
ti ≤ wi
, (12)
where xi ∈ R and ti ∈ R are the optimization variables and λ and µ are fixed. We
denote by x¯i and t¯i the solution to problem (12).
We define
si :=
m∑
j=1
t¯j − x¯i, ∀i ∈ A, (13)
and
rij := x¯i − x¯j , ∀(i, j) such that i > j. (14)
For a given set of solutions x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯m) and t¯ = (t¯1, t¯2, . . . , t¯m) to the agent
subproblems (12), the quantities si and rij are the subgradients of g(λ,µ) with respect
to λi and µij , respectively, for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , m and i > j.
2
To proceed with the proof we require the following intermediate lemmas. Here, we
only state the lemmas and prove them later.
Lemma 2. There exists a Υ such that for any k,
‖s(k)‖2 + ‖r(k)‖2 ≤ Υ.
Lemma 3. For any solution (λ′,µ′) of (10) in C,
lim
k→∞
g(λmin(k),µmin(k)) = g(λ
′,µ′). (15)
(where λmin(k),µmin(k) are defined in step 4 of Algorithm 1.)
Now we complete the proof of Theorem 1 using the results of the above lemmas.
2Thus, in Step 5 of Algorithm 1, since the term x¯i − x¯j of (14) gives the mismatch in the level of public good
as desired by the agents i and j, the update for µij can be interpreted as the price of being at the current level of
mismatch; the subgradient update gives a mechanism for incentivizing pairwise negotiations between agents i and
j to reach a consensus.
November 5, 2018 DRAFT
10
From Lemma 3, we know that g(λmin(k),µmin(k)) tends to g(λ
′,µ′), where (λ′,µ′)
is an optimal solution of (10). At convergence, the solutions x⋆i and t
⋆
i , which are the
maximizers from Step 3 of Algorithm 1 when λ = λ⋆ and µ = µ⋆, are the same as the
maximizers for the agent subproblem (12) (for all i ∈ A). Furthermore, at convergence
we get x⋆i = x
⋆
j = x
⋆ for all i, j ∈ A, j 6= i because of Step 5 of the algorithm and the
fact that ζk > 0 for all k = 1, 2, . . .. By strong duality,
3 the dual value at the solution to
(10) is the same as the optimal value for (7), which, in turn, is the same as the optimal
value for problem (2). Because the objective function for (12) is, by assumption, strictly
concave, the optimal solution for each agent’s subproblem (12) is unique, and so x⋆ is
the solution to the problem (2).
We now proceed to prove Lemmas 2 and 3.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: For any i ∈ A, 0 ≤ x¯i ≤ L. Also since t¯i ≤ wi, we have
0 ≤ x¯i ≤
∑
j∈A
t¯j = t¯i +
∑
j∈A
j 6=i
t¯j ≤ t¯i +
∑
j∈A
j 6=i
wj . (16)
Rearranging (16) we obtain
−
∑
j∈A
j 6=i
wj ≤ t¯i ≤ wi, ∀i ∈ A. (17)
Now, by using (17) and the definitions of si and rij (equations (13) and (14), respectively),
we can show that, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , m,
|si| ≤ L+m max
1≤j≤m
wj (18)
|rij| ≤ 2L. (19)
3In our problem strong duality holds because problem (2) is a convex problem and Slater’s condition [12] is
satisfied.
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Therefore,
||s(k)||2 + ||r(k)||2 ≤
(
m(L+m max
1≤j≤m
wj)
2
)
+m(2L)2
≤ (4m+m(m+ 1)2) [max{L,w1, w2, . . . , wm}]
2 := Υ. (20)
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Consider (λ′,µ′) as a solution of (10). Then
‖(λ(k + 1),µ(k + 1))− (λ′,µ′)‖2
= ‖λ(k + 1)− λ′‖2 + ‖µ(k + 1)− µ′‖2
= ‖
[
λ(k)− ζks
(k)
]+
− λ′‖2 + ‖µ(k)− ζkr
(k) − µ′‖2
≤ ‖λ(k)− ζks
(k) − λ′‖2 + ‖µ(k)− ζkr
(k) − µ′‖2
= ‖λ(k)− λ′‖2 + ‖µ(k)− µ′‖2 + ζ2k
(
‖s(k)‖2 + ‖r(k)‖2
)
− 2ζk
(
[s(k)]T (λ(k)− λ′) + [r(k)]T (µ(k)− µ′)
)
≤ ‖λ(k)− λ′‖2 + ‖µ(k)− µ′‖2 + ζ2k
(
‖s(k)‖2 + ‖r(k)‖2
)
− 2ζk (g(λ(k),µ(k))− g(λ
′,µ′)) (21)
≤ ‖λ(k)− λ′‖2 + ‖µ(k)− µ′‖2 + ζ2kΥ− 2ζk (g(λ(k),µ(k))− g(λ
′,µ′)) , (22)
where (21) is due to the definition of subgradient4 of g at (λ(k),µ(k)), and (22) results
from Lemma 2. Repeatedly using (22) along with the assumption ‖λ(0)−λ′‖2+‖µ(0)−
µ′‖2 ≤ Λ (Remark 1) we obtain
0 ≤ ‖(λ(k + 1),µ(k + 1))− (λ′,µ′)‖2
≤ Λ +
k∑
i=0
ζ2i Υ− 2
k∑
i=0
ζi (g(λ(i),µ(i))− g(λ
′,µ′)) . (23)
4A subgradient of g at a point x is a vector s that satisfies the inequality g(y)− g(x) ≥ sT (y − x) for all y.
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Since
k∑
i=0
ζi (g(λ(i),µ(i))− g(λ
′,µ′)) ≥
(
min
0≤i≤k
g(λ(i),µ(i))− g(λ′,µ′)
) k∑
i=0
ζi, (24)
(24) along with (23) imply that
0 ≤ Λ +
k∑
i=0
ζ2kΥ− 2
(
min
0≤i≤k
g(λ(i),µ(i))− g(λ′,µ′)
) k∑
i=0
ζi. (25)
Therefore,
min
0≤i≤k
g(λ(i),µ(i))− g(λ′,µ′) ≤
Λ +
∑k
i=0 ζ
2
i Υ
2
∑k
i=0 ζi
(26)
and consequently,
lim
k→∞
(
min
0≤i≤k
g(λ(i),µ(i))− g(λ′,µ′)
)
≤ lim
k→∞
(
Λ +
∑k
i=0 ζ
2
i Υ
2
∑k
i=0 ζi
)
. (27)
Since ζi, i = 1, 2, · · · are such that
∑∞
i=0 ζi =∞ and
∑∞
i=0 ζi <∞,
lim
k→∞
(
Λ +
∑k
i=0 ζ
2
i Υ
2
∑k
i=0 ζi
)
= 0,
and, therefore, by (27),
lim
k→∞
(
min
0≤i≤k
g(λ(i),µ(i))− g(λ′,µ′)
)
= 0, (28)
i.e.,
lim
k→∞
g(λmin(k),µmin(k)) = g(λ
′,µ′). (29)
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